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COMPETITION POLICY EVALUATION THROUGH DAMAGE 
ESTIMATION IN FUEL RETAIL CARTEL 
Simone Maciel Cuiabano 
Abstract. I estimate the fuel retailer cartel damages in the south of Brazil 
using reduced and structural forms for supply and demand. Brazilian 
Competition Authority (CADE) documents help to characterize the ethanol 
and gasoline retailers involved in the collusion. The objective is to evaluate 
competition policy by comparing the amount of estimated damages with the 
amount of applied fines. This paper also adds an important result to gasoline 
substitution, as data shows ethanol is perceived as a perfect substitute and it is 
price inelastic. Results show an overcharge of 3.6% to 6.6% in the gasoline 
market and up to 12% in the ethanol market during collusion. Fines should 
consider the deterrence effect and, giving the low probability of detection, 
CADE’s applied fines seemed to be in line with this objective. 
Resumo. Este trabalho estima os danos causados pelo cartel nos postos de 
gasolina na regiao sul do Brasil usando tanto uma equacao reduzida quanto 
um modelo estrutural de demanda e oferta. Documentos do Conselho 
Administrativo de Defesa Economica (CADE) ajudam a caracterizar os postos 
envolvidos na colusao nos mercados de etanol e gasolina. O objetivo é avaliar 
os efeitos da politica de concorrencia comparando o montante do dano 
estimado com as multas aplicadas.Em adicional, esse trabalho tambem 
contribui para a literatura sobre substituicao de gasolina, uma vez que os dados 
apontam que o etanol é percebido como substituto perfeito e é preco inelastico. 
Os resultados mostram que houve um sobrecusto causado pelo cartel de ordem 
de 4.6% a 6.6% no mercado de gasolina e de ate 12% no mercado de etanol. 
As multas aplicadas, contudo, devem considerar a probabilidade de o cartel 
ser descoberto e, dada sua baixa probabilidade, as multas aplicadas no 
presente caso parecem estar alinhadas com esse objetivo.   
1. Introduction 
Increasingly, Competition Authorities (CAs) around the world are 
quantifying the aggregate benefits of their activities as an impact assessment. 
In 2016, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) launched a reference guide on ex-post evaluation of CAs’ 
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enforcement decisions. Those assessments are of growing interest since they 
demonstrate the ‘value for money’ of this public policy.  In this article I 
estimate the fuel retailer cartel damages in the south region of Brazil to 
compare with the amount of fines imposed by the Brazilian Competition 
Authority (CADE). As other jurisdictions, cartels are illegal in the country, 
being the participants subject to administrative and criminal investigations1. 
Antitrust law determines that fines may be no less than the amount of harm 
resulting from the conduct. However, CADE has seldom resorted to this 
provision when determining fines; when done, the amount imposed was less 
than the equivalent of the maximum percentage of the defendant’s turnover 
allowed by the law2.  
Investigation on antitrust violations in the fuel sectors have been a 
thorn in the side of most CAs’ around the world3. Although there is an 
understanding that fuels price volatility can be a result of other factors – i.e. 
demand or cost shocks, pricing strategies (ex. Clark and Houde, 2013, 2014)  
– the lack of comprehension from general public may raise doubts on how 
efficient CAs enforce the antitrust law. In the Brazilian experience, the amount 
of complaints in the fuel retail sector takes almost 1/4 of the workload of 
CADE. From 2005 to 2010, the institution received an average of 200 
complaints per year only in this sector. However, the authority has condemned 
only 15 unions and fuel retailers’ in different municipalities until 2015 
because of lack of direct proof.  
This work is related to two strands of literature: demand estimation 
for ethanol and its substitutability for gasoline and cartel damage estimation. 
Anderson (2012) claims to be the first to provide estimates for ethanol 
elasticity and it is very sensitive to relative prices. This paper contributes to 
this finding, since cartelists pricing strategy required not only a raise in 
gasoline price but also a drop in ethanol price in order to keep relative prices 
within a margin equivalent to fuel performance and stations distance to the 
                                                     
1 Article 36 of Law 12,529/11 sets forth the basic framework for anticompetitive 
conduct in Brazil. Criminal cartel investigations are responsibility of the Federal 
Prosecution Bureau and ruled by the Supreme Court.   
2 Antitrust Law determines fines against the companies may range from 0.1 to 20 
% of the company’s or group of companies’ pre-tax turnover in the economic 
sector affected by the conduct, in the year prior to the beginning of the 
investigation. This has been used as a rule of thumb by CADE’s Tribunal due to 
the difficulties in harm estimation. 
3 OECD (2013). 
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city center. It also innovates with a database from the Brazilian ethanol 
market, the most consolidated flex fuel vehicles commercialization in the 
world4.   
The literature on damage estimation is quite available since the 
implementation of private claims in both in the US and in Europe. Ashurst 
(2004) was the first one to compile a cartel damage quantification study for 
the EC, giving a structured overview of the court decisions at the time of 
examination. Connor (2009) examined the antitrust litigation of the lysine 
cartel rather intensively and points to quantification problems as he 
emphasizes that the before and after method is rather critical in cases in which 
cartel formation took place after a recession and under such circumstances the 
benchmark might be understated and damages overstated, et vice versa. Dijk 
and Verboven (2007) also distinguish between damage quantification 
methods that use comparator indicators and methods that are based on direct 
information about the cartelized market. They also introduce critical loss 
analysis: by determining the break-even point at which demand decreases 
given a particular price increase and comparing this to the expected actual 
loss, cartel price overcharges were calculated. The discussion about the 
deterrence effect of cartel fines is also a wide-raging scientific area that is 
directly related to the actual research. Various studies come to the conclusion 
that the deterring effects of corporate penalties indeed have been sub-optimal 
during the last years and that competition authorities have to employ detection 
in addition to deterrence mechanisms  (Connor (2009) and Hüschelrath and 
Weigand (2010)). In Brazil, Cade (2016) published a study on the damages 
calculation in the cartel of peroxides. Using three different methodologies 
(time series, difference in differences and a structural model) and observed 
that damages and fines are very similar in value terms. However, considering 
the importance of the deterrence effect, either the amount of fines should be 
raised or the same amount should be claimed by the judiciary as a 
compensating effect. As this is not yet implemented in the Brazilian system, 
it should be considered as a public policy instrument. 
This work is divided in 6 parts, including this introduction: in 
session 2, I review the main characteristics of the cartel in Londrina, using 
information provided in the condemnation files. Session 3 describes the 
estimation methodology and presents some descriptive statistics available for 
                                                     
4 By 2007, when the cartel was in place, 69% of total passenger vehicles in Brazil 
were flex-fuel (ANFAVEA 2008).   
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the case. In session 4, I present the main estimation results and the results of 
a general model of price effects in the ethanol and gasoline markets. Session 
5 compares the results of estimated damages with the applied fines. I conclude 
in session 6, where I point out some outcomes that might be useful for future 
discussion of damage estimation and competition policy evaluation.    
2. The Cartel in Londrina Area 
A. Investigation and Prosecution 
In the 12th of August of 20075 , the Secretariat for Economic 
Defense (SDE)6 opened a cartel investigation after receiving a complaint from 
the State Policy of Parana informing about a criminal investigation relating 
fuel retailers in in Londrina metropolitan area (Londrina, Cambe, Jataizinho 
and Ibipora cities). The State Policy private call interception of the fuel 
distributor Oil Petro revealed the existence of collusion in Londrina retail 
market. In August 29th, SDE, SEAE and the Parana policy deflagrated 
operation “Medusa III” initiating the execution of search warrants in 16 
retailers located in the above mentioned neighbors municipalities7. 
Phone calls extracts and the questioning documents showed that 
collusion started when one of the retailers, located in a highway in the 
municipality of Cambe (“Posto Paizao” or Etiel Comercio de Combustiveis 
Ltda.), about 15 km from Londrina center, dropped ethanol price in the 
beginning of 2007. In response, one of its competitor (“Rede Posto Carajas” 
or Auto Posto Gasosan Ltda.), located 12.5 km from the center, also dropped 
its price, reaching the lowest level of R$0.94 per liter. This ‘price war’ started 
                                                     
5 CADE has convicted 15 cartels involving fuel retailers up to 2015. Most of them 
relates to the price liberalization transition period (1999-2004) for which retailers 
price are not available (Cade (2014)).      
6 The competition system in Brazil was composed of 3 organizations until 2012: 
the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE), attached to the Ministry of 
Finance, responsible for merger and acquisitions instructions; the Secretariat of 
Economic Law (SDE), attached to the Ministry of Justice, which instructed cases 
related to collusion and antitrust violation’s complaints; Council of 
Administrative Economic Defense (CADE), the Court who decided on merger 
consolidation and antitrust violations condemnations.   
7 Process number of reference 08012.0116681/2007-30. Public information 
disclosure at  
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to attract drivers used to refuel in retailers located at Londrina city center, 
whose average price of ethanol ranged from R$1.39 to 1.74 per liter and 
average price for gasoline ranged from R$2.39 to 2.55 per liter.   
In April/May 2007, fuel retailer partners located in Londrina center 
started talking with owners of the two firms in Cambe to agree on an end of 
the ‘price war’, combining the amount of price increases, price fixing8 and 
dates for readjustments. Cartel leaders intervened together with Londrina’s 
retailers, forcing9 all associates to agree on price stabilization. Following 
CADE’s documentation, the price uniformization policy did not require large 
amount of efforts since the condemned retailers were allegedly used as price 
reference to other fuel retailers in the region. 
From the files, I observed that the cartel operated until the end of 
August 2007, when dawn raids and temporary arrest warrants were carried 
out. In the threats, fuel retailers decided that a “fair price” in Cambe would be 
R$1.18 to ethanol and R$2.32 to gasoline, while in Londrina these prices 
would be aligned at R$1.33 and R$2.43.  These price differences between 
ethanol and gasoline are important to explain how apparently distant fuel 
retailers, i.e., non-competitors, suddenly became fiercely competitors and 
targets of other retailers. Ethanol is considered to be equal to gasoline when 
the per-liter price of the first reaches 70% of the per-liter price of gasoline. 
Even if gasoline and ethanol are priced about equally in $per kilometer 
traveled, Salvo and Huse (2013) highlight there are consumer’s tastes over 
both fuels, such as consumers’ budget constraints (richer consumers prefer 
gasoline to ethanol), age and environment concerns, that might affect this 
substitutability.  
For instance, one consumer making the choice on gasoline or 
ethanol, considering only price preferences, facing the lower bound of R$2.39 
per liter, would compare the profitability of buying ethanol only if its price 
were lower than R$1.68. However, it also needed to consider if this price was 
being offered by the same station or in the neighborhood, otherwise it would 
need to consider transportation costs. Using a vehicle with a performance of 
10Km per liter in gasoline and 7km liter in ethanol, the 70% price difference 
                                                     
8 The agreement went up to the 2nd decimal level price combination in which 
some retailers could raise or drop their prices up to R$0,03, adjusting it to demand 
changes.  
9 The pressure involved physical threatening, verbal abuse and harassment of 
retailers. 
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would justify the choice of a 30km round trip to fill up a tank with 40 liters of 
ethanol – an economy of almost 50%. In CADE’s documents, one retailer 
owner in the city center confirmed that sales dropped by 300-500 liters a day, 
not clarifying, however, if these drops are related to gasoline or ethanol.  
The cartel operated in two groups: the core one, coordinated by the 
Guarda family and two other price retailers, was responsible for determining 
and price monitoring. This involved the participation of a fuel distributor, Oil 
Petro, whose commercial manager, Mauro Guarda, kept vertical relations with 
one fuel retailer of the same name.  The second group involved main fuel 
retailers in the cities of Londrina and Cambe considered price makers because 
of their commercialized size. Cade’s documents show that these retailers 
accepted to participate in the agreement by changing their price in the date 
suggested by the core group, influencing the rest of fuel retailers to follow the 
leaders.       
Apart from penal prosecution, Cade deliberated on penalties, which 
summed up more R$10 million (US$5million). The amount of fines was ruled 
based on art. 37 and 45 of the National Antitrust Law 12.529/2011 which can 
range from 0.1% to 20% from the total firm revenue. According to the 
Commissioner’s10, her decision of fixing a 13%-15% rate was based on the 
direct and indirect participation of the defendants. Although the law explicitly 
affirms that imposed fines should not be lesser than illegal profits, estimation 
difficulties impede Cade to proceed with this ruling more frequently.   
3. Estimation strategy 
A.Methodology 
In order to define the illegal profits and the damages of the cartel, I 
used Cade’s information to define the duration of the cartel, from May to 
August 2007. Quantifying damages involves estimating the price that would 
have occurred absent the cartel during the period of the cartel. For that, I need 
to characterize the market conditions for ethanol and gasoline demand in 
Londrina.   
I start with a standard oligopoly model of competition that 
incorporates price discrimination over fuels and stations characteristics. As 
from obtained in cartel documents, retailers set they prices differently from 
                                                     
10 Frazao(2013). Decision in the Process 08012.011668/2007-30, vol. 8.  
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which other, based on location and demand flow. These characteristics were 
observed even during the cartel period when they set prices differences up to 
the third decimal level. Considering that retailers operate in ethanol and 
gasoline, the individual firm profit function is: 
(1) 𝜋𝑗 = (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑤𝑔 − 𝑐𝑔)𝑠𝑔 + (𝑝𝑒 − 𝑤𝑒 − 𝑐𝑒)𝑠𝑒 
Where𝑝𝑔, 𝑝𝑒 are the respective prices for gasoline and ethanol, 𝑤𝑔, 
𝑤𝑒 are their respective wholesale paid price,  𝑐𝑔, 𝑐𝑒 the retailer’s constant 
marginal cost of distribution for each fuel. Fuels specific market shares are 
given by 𝑠𝑔, 𝑠𝑒. Cost shifters are such as the wholesale price, distance to city 
center, number of pumps and tankage size. 
Assuming the existence of pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, 
the price for each fuel must satisfy the following first order conditions: 
(2) 𝑠𝑔 + (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑤𝑔 − 𝑐𝑔)
𝜕𝑠𝑔
𝜕𝑝𝑔
= 0 
(3) 𝑠𝑒 + (𝑝𝑒 − 𝑤𝑒 − 𝑐𝑒)
𝜕𝑠𝑒
𝜕𝑝𝑒
= 0 
Equations (2), (3) imply that the vector 𝛾of retailer’s 
margins is the retail price 𝑝 minus the wholesale price 𝑤 minus the 
marginal cost of distribution 𝑐: 
(4) 𝛾 = 𝑝 − 𝑤 − 𝑐 
Price-cost margins estimations require the observation of the 
demand shape to infer firm’s margins. Anderson (2012) develops a model of 
demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute where the household will choose 
the fuel with the lower ethanol-equivalent price. Aggregate demand for both 
gasoline and ethanol will be a smooth function of relative prices when fuel-
switching price ratios are distributed continuously. The log-linear aggregated 
demand equations for gasoline and ethanol are therefore: 
(5) 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑔𝑖𝑡 =∝𝑔+ 𝛽0𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 − 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 −
𝛽𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛 + ε𝑖𝑗 
(6) 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑖𝑡 =∝𝑒+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 − 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 −
𝛽𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛 + ε𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝑄𝑔𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑖𝑡 are both quantities of gasoline and ethanol sold 
by each station i in time t, 𝑝𝑔𝑗 𝑝𝑒𝑗 are the retailers price for gasoline and 
ethanol, timetravel11 captures the travel time period between i and n, the cartel 
                                                     
11 Data collect on May 13, 2017 from 8:30 pm to 14pm, local time of Londrina. 
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leader in city center, ε is an index of unobserved station attributes. I will test 
whether travel distance from the city center to retailers located elsewhere may 
affect demand preferences as pointed out by Houde (2012).  
Reduced form demand estimation equations for gasoline and ethanol 
prices in a panel for i retailers in time t are such as: 
(7) 𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 =∝0+ 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑗𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑔 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑔 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
(8) 𝑝𝑒𝑗𝑡 =∝5+ 𝛽6𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑗𝑛 + 𝛽8𝑤𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑐𝑒 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝑤 are costs related to the wholesale distributors and to other 
cost shifters such as information on tankage size and if the retailer is 
unbranded. Once estimated parameters for each fuel I can include a dummy 
for the firms involved in the cartel during that specific time and use a linear 
estimator with random effects such as:  
(9) 𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 =∝0+ 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑗𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑔 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑔 +
𝜑𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐼𝐷𝑔 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
(10) 𝑝𝑒𝑗𝑡 =∝5+ 𝛽6𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑗𝑛 + 𝛽8𝑤𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑐𝑒 +
𝜑𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐼𝐷𝑒 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
For the structural model, I estimate equations (5) and (6) using cost 
information such as the wholesale prices and tankage as instruments. I also 
include the average price for the 1km competitors’ on gasoline and ethanol to 
control for price changes not related to the sold quantity. With the estimated 
elasticities, I can simulate the “but for price” for each retailer considering its 
individual mark-up rules and wholesale costs. 
B. Database and Statistics 
I used information in the file process to characterize cartelists and 
the cartel period. In addition, I aggregated 3 databases with information 
regarding fuel retailers in Londrina and Cambe12 obtained from Brazilian Fuel 
Regulator (Agencia Nacional do Petroleo, Gas Natural - ANP): (1) an 
unbalanced weekly panel of retailers and wholesale prices for diesel, gasoline 
and ethanol from 2007 to 2009, including brand characteristics and 
georeferenced locations; (2) a monthly panel of retailers acquired quantities 
of diesel, gasoline and ethanol also spanning from 2007 to 2009; (3) a cross 
                                                     
12 ANP price collection methodology does not include n Ibipora or Jataizinho due 
to its sample size. Price and quantity information for each gas station are not 
available in the disclosured process files.   
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section of retailers characteristics such as numbers of pumps and tankage. 
Since this last refers to retailers in 2014, I also crosschecked for information 
in ANP website13 regarding retailers who are no longer in operation but whose 
characteristics are still available.  
I obtained travel and time distances using Google API for each 
station regarding one fuel retailer located at city center but not cited in the 
files14. I also added information regarding regional inflation rate for the period 
and control variables such as total number of passenger’s cars. The sample 
includes prices and quantities for the sale of gasoline, ethanol and diesel in 
154 fuel retailers in Londrina for a period of 36 months (3 years), totalizing 
5,544 observations. Considering missing price data, however, I have only 443 
completed information for gasoline and 440 completed information for 
ethanol. For inflation, I consider the State of Parana index for Consumer Price 
(IPCA) provided by the Brazilian Institute of Statistics (IBGE). Other general 
price cost shifters, such as the international sugar price and petrol were 
obtained through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics. Licensed 
vehicles in the city of Londrina and Cambe were provided by the Parana State 
Department for Traffic Control (Detran/PR).     
Table 1 summarizes the information related to the fuel quantity sold 
in Londrina. On average, fuel retailers sold about 75,000 liters of gasoline, 
50,000 liters of ethanol and 76,000 of diesel per month. However, these 
volumes changed along the years, remarked in 2009 when there was a 20% 
rise in the commercialization of ethanol and 18% of diesel compared to 2007. 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS ON VOLUMES 
 Overall 2007 2008 2009 
Quantities 
(liter/month
) 
Mean SD # Mean SD # Mean SD # Mean SD # 
Gasoline 
74,914 54,056 
15
7 
76,68
0 
51,187 
12
7 
74,91
4 
54,056 
15
7 
68,599 53,176 
13
0 
Ethanol 
49,790 45,410 
16
0 
33,24
6 
29,923 
13
2 
49,79
0 
45,410 
16
0 
56,655 50,565 
13
1 
Diesel 
76,271 13,3078 
15
4 
71,45
6 
15,108 
11
8 
76,27
1 
13,307 
15
4 
89,905 12,996 
13
0 
Source: own calculations. 
The statistics also highlight the amount of heterogeneity across 
stations in Londrina between 2007 and 2009. Gasoline had the highest 
standard deviations compared to the commercialization of diesel, for instance. 
                                                     
13 http://www.anp.gov.br/postos/consulta.asp 
14 Posto Transamerica, cnpj 07.775.477/0001-98. 
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However, the commercialization of ethanol was increasingly dispersed along 
the years - standard deviation went from 30,000 liters in 2007 to 50,500 liters 
in 2009. This heterogeneity is also caught by characteristics such as number 
of pumps and tanks. Overall, stations have more variation regarding the 
number of gasoline pumps and less for diesel, despite these last vary more in 
terms of tankage. Stations prosecuted for collusion, however, had more similar 
characteristics in terms of number of pumps of gasoline and ethanol, 
corroborating the information available in Cade’s files regarding the collusion 
in these two markets.  On average, cartelists had 3 gasoline pumps 3 pumps 
for ethanol while stores outside the cartel had 6 pumps for gasoline and 4 for 
ethanol. However, they had more pumps for diesel, reflecting the agreement 
choice for retailers located in the highway and used to have more clients for 
diesel. Stores in the cartel were also slightly geographically more spread in 
the same comparison as shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS ON PRICES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
 Overall In collusion Not in collusion 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Gasoline price (R$/Lt) 2.451 0.099 2.370 0.071 2.451 0.099 
Ethanol price (R$/Lt) 1.466 0.206 1.192 0.122 1.468 0.205 
Diesel price (R$/Lt) 1.914 0.088 1.767 0.041 1.916 0.087 
Pumps gas 5.047 3.056 3.857 2.762 5.055 3.057 
Pumps ethanol 3.506 1.938 3.000 1.342 3.509 1.941 
Pumps diesel 2.659 2.156 3.571 2.891 2.653 2.150 
Tanks gasoline (liter) 32.118 12.473 25.000 10.607 32.167 12.472 
Tanks ethanol (liter) 22.412 10.783 19.286 6.944 22.433 10.803 
Tanks disel (liter) 24.529 20.463 28.571 13.887 24.501 20.500 
Distance (Km) 5.538 5.233 6.455 4.977 5.532 5.235 
Drive distance (minutes) 10.859 6.591 11.636 6.823 10.854 6.590 
Source: own calculations. 
In terms of price, the overall price per liter for gasoline was R$2.45 
(US$1.22) with a dispersion of 0.09 cents. During the cartel, colluding firms 
presented lower average gasoline price than non-colluding ones (0.08 cents 
difference); nevertheless, colluders presented lower dispersion. Similar 
patterns can be seen for ethanol and diesel prices: despite cartelists ethanol 
and diesel prices were about R$0.27 and R$0.15 lower than non-cartelists, 
their variation across stations was much lower. The fact that these fuel stations 
were located far from the city center explains the lower average price. In 
addition, as documented in the files, cartelists have greater tankage in diesel, 
being an important part of total revenue.  
One of the most important changes in the operations of the fuels 
market in Brazil concerns its business model. Until 1997, service stations were 
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necessarily tied to distributors and carried their brands, acting in the market as 
franchise units. Thus, transactions between distributors and service stations 
occurred through loyalty contracts and negotiation exclusivity. Since 
deregulation, a new model has allowed the establishment of stations without 
supply contracts with a distributor. These are dubbed “unbranded” or “white 
flag” service stations, insofar as they are not franchises of any distributors. 
Retailers involved in the cartel were a majority of unbranded retailers (54%), 
which also helps to understand the lower price differences and the role of Oil 
Petrol, the regional distributor, as one of the leaders of the cartel.  
4. Estimation Results 
A. Gasoline 
As the period of the cartel and the colluding firms are known, 
reduced form estimations can help to give a glimpse on how much price were 
affected. Gasoline and ethanol prices are explained by costs and demand 
shifters such as distance (time to travel from the city center of Londrina to 
each retailer, including those in Cambe), if the store is not branded, tankage 
and number of pumps. For gasoline, I tested different specifications where the 
most robust includes retailer price information for ethanol. This is not a 
novelty in the Brazilian market because of fuels substitutability. Ethanol 
retailer price’s (“PRECOVENDAETANOLd”) augmentation in 1 Real would 
cause an average rise of 0.089 cents in gasoline retailer’s price.15. Time to 
travel (“time”) and travel distance to travel (“dist”) seemed to be correlated, 
so I dropped one of them in the final specification. Travel distance from the 
city center presented the negative expected signs, though the magnitude of the 
impact was not very high: for each kilometer, there was a drop lower than one 
cent of Real. Here I needed more information on commuting choices to better 
observe consumer’s choice. 
Acquisition price from distributors (“PRECOCOMPRAGASd”) 
represented the highest and most straightforward impacts on retailer’s prices: 
1 Real of price increase from distributors had a direct pass-through effect over 
retailer’s prices, ranging from 1.04 to 1.05 price augmentation at the pump. 
On the other hand, the choice of being an unbranded store (“d_branca”) did 
not seem to have much impact on retailers’ prices, which might indicate that 
                                                     
15Nearly 50% of the vehicles in the State of Parana had the flex-fuel technology 
already in place. (Ministry of Environment (2011). Graphic 70, page 90).  
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a tacit collusion behavior was already in place in both municipalities. Storage 
capacity (“tanks_gas”) is correlated with lower prices, as it was expected from 
literature; these effects, however, were strikingly lower compared to the 
positive coefficients of price increase, which might reflects managers’ 
capacity to avoid extra costs. 
During the cartel, the price of the firms involved in collusion was 
0.13 cents higher than other periods, including before and after the cartel 
(Table 3). I cannot assume this as a direct effect of the cartel though since 
there are also effects associated with the cross price elasticity for the 
consumption of ethanol.  
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Table 3. Reduced Price Demand Regressions for Gasoline 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Dependent: retail price of gasoline   
Demand factors    
Constant 
0.1096105 0.1036447 0.0931006 0.043569 
(0.043469) (0.0386335) (0.0386833) (0.0151887) 
dist 
-0.0171896 -0.017215 -0.0170129 -0.002309 
(0.0063476) (0.0062115) (0.0061915) (0.0008059) 
time 
0.00895 0.0090318     
(0.0050273) (0.0049132)     
Cost factors       
PRECOCOMPRAGASd 
1.053047 1.052917 1.049946 1.047202 
(0.0205515) (0.0205155) (0.0204499) (0.0177587) 
d_branca 
-0.0084004       
(0.0227797)       
PRECOVENDAETANOLd 
0.0897138 0.0896416 0.0980785 0.0937471 
(0.0288679) 
 
(0.0287533) (0.0269798) (0.0286924) 
tanks_gas  -0.0023663 
-0.0022545 
-
0.0019947 
-0.0014993 
 (0.0009149) 
 
(0.0008318) (0.0008364) (0.0008217) 
Collusion         
dummyidcartel 
     0.1384666 0.1392501 
   (0.0629351) (0.0631914) 
sigma_u 0.03668116 
0.03356806 
 
0.01212934 0.04053157 
sigma_e 0.10310978 
0.10473205 
 
0.04987219 0.10356332 
rho 0.11233969 
0.09315895 
 
0.05584701 0.13282551 
R-squared (overall) 0.9989 0.999 0.999 0.9991 
Standard errors in (). Results at specifications 3 and 4 are significant at 1%. Source: 
own calculations. 
For the structural demand estimation, I regressed equation (5) using 
as instruments the information on wholesale costs per retailer, the size of 
tankage and the average price of neighboring retailers in a 1 km ray. Price 
effects on quantities have the expected signs and it confirms the low price 
elasticity for gasoline in the region: a 1% price raise drops the demanded 
quantity less than 0.6%. The effect of a price raise in ethanol increases the 
demand for gasoline also around 0.6% (Table 4).    
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Table 4. Demand Estimation for Gasoline 
Specification 1 2 3 
Dependent: logarithm of gasoline quantity 
_cons 
25.55381 26.94924 26.84867 
(6.698227) (6.828287) (6.840229) 
lprecovendagas 
-0.4547253 -0.5590767 -0.5734533 
(0.3077597) (0.3060727) (0.3066743) 
lprecovendaetanol 
0.5183416 0.5999931 0.6123401 
(0.2816827) (0.2788484) (0.2793655) 
lcars 
-1.182731 -1.291657 -1.303361 
(0.5447383) (0.5551726) (0.5559122) 
ltime  
  0.1144555 
  (0.1375862) 
sigma_u 0.63035553 0.60124663 0.6053546 
sigma_e 0.21563805 0.18700162 0.18835183 
rho 0.89523489 0.91179696 0.91173498 
Standard errors in (). 1. Instruments: lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas; 2.  
lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas  ltanksg; 3. lpm_conc_1km  lprecocompragas  
ltanksg. Source: own calculations. 
Overcharges can be calculated supposing the “but for price” is a 
result of a monopolistic competition in which retailers add a markup rule to 
wholesale costs, given its share: 
(11) 𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔𝑖𝑡 + (−
𝑠
𝜀
) 
Overcharges in the structural model are also positive and significant, 
in average R$0.38 cents higher (9.8% overcharge, against 4.7% overcharge in 
the reduced form).  
B. Ethanol 
In the ethanol price specifications, I included both the same demand 
variables as in gasoline (“dist” and “time”). For cost shifters, I also included 
the acquisition price of ethanol from distributors 
(“PRECOCOMPRAETANOLd”) as well as the gasoline substitute effects 
(“PRECOVENDAGASd”). The main difference is the inclusion of the index 
of the international sugar price (“sugar”) to the analysis since the same cane 
is used for sugar or ethanol production. In Brazil, producers have a flexibility 
to switch between sugar and ethanol and the use of cane was about 50% to 
50% until 2006. From then, industry growth switched to ethanol due to an 
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increasing number of FFV vehicles and an increased demand for fuel ethanol. 
However, producer’s decisions on the supply of ethanol are highly dependent 
on the future prospective price for sugar. For instance, sugar mix was 
maximized in 2011 and 2012 due to high global sugar prices, leading to a 
lower supply of ethanol16.  
The impact of sugar prices on retailers’ was positive and significant 
in specifications 3 and 4. Although in specification 1 the sign was negative, 
this one did include extra variables that I dropped in other regressions due to 
lower explanatory power, such as time and distance. As in the gasoline 
regressions, travel distance had a negative effect on ethanol’s price but with 
the same low magnitude impact. Information on the unbranded store 
(“d_branca”) also did not bring information on prices, so I dropped in the last 
specifications, as well as the information on the number of ethanol pumps 
(“bicos_eta”). 
Acquisition price from distributors 
(“PRECOCOMPRAETANOLd”) also did seem to have a direct effect on 
retailers’ prices, though in a much smaller magnitude than gasoline costs pass-
through. This might be a reflex of consumer’s preferences for the later and 
firms’ ability to absorb some of the costs in order to avoid excessive stocks 
for the product. Gasoline retail price augmentation 
(“PRECOVENDAGASd”), on the other hand, had a higher pass-through on 
ethanol’s price than the effect of the ethanol price on gasoline. This shows that 
retailers pricing strategies consider not only costs, but also demand 
preferences and substitution. A higher gasoline retail price allows firms to 
raise more ethanol’s price than the opposite, respecting the fuel efficiency 
thumb rule of 70% of ethanol/gasoline (Table 5).      
During collusion, ethanol prices were 0.038 cents lower than prices 
out of that period. Although this might seem controversial, it may reflect firms 
pricing strategy to keep gasoline and ethanol prices balanced and to keep a 
stable revenue for colluders. Remembering that the cartel started after a “price 
war” in the ethanol market in which the revenue of competitors firms was 
lowering because of consumers’ gasoline substitution. By lowering ethanol 
prices to a certain level, cartelists kept the amount of gasoline and ethanol 
sales. 
 
                                                     
16 Covrig (2014). 
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  Table 5. Reduced Price Demand Regressions for Ethanol 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Dependent: retail price of ethanol   
Demand factors    
_cons 
0.2293977 -0.6820153 -0.7618369 -0.7903439 
(0.1088252) (0.1000504) (0.0948181) (0.0952531) 
dist 
0.0030712 0.0105773   -0.0050015 
(0.0134118) (0.0080061)   (0.0023574) 
time 
-0.0052832 -0.013321 -0.0053529   
(0.0110065) (0.006522) (0.0018683)   
Cost factors         
PRECOCOMPRAETANOLd 
1.161412 0.4200158 0.3800242 0.3804374 
(0.0207021) (0.0603231) (0.0548631) (0.0564332) 
d_branca 
0.1917472 0.048704     
(0.0469142) (0.0323915)     
PRECOVENDAGASd 
  0.4033752 0.4252455 0.4249725 
  (0.0317775) (0.0290005) (0.0298097) 
tank_eta 
-0.0032696 -0.0022551 -0.002262 -0.0025557 
(0.0020202) (0.001217) (0.0011911) (0.0012002) 
sugar 
-0.0049045 0.0535773 0.0575578 0.0578314 
0.0066979 0.0064634 0.0059689 0.0060654 
Collusion         
dummyidcartel 
      -0.0382886 
      (0.1550836) 
sigma_u 0.08968003 0.00690577 0 0 
sigma_e 0.18962417 0.13691181 0.14413066 0.14483054 
rho 0.18278497 0.00253769 0 0 
R-squared (overall) 0.9846 0.9899 0.9932 0.9932 
Standard errorsin (). Results are significant at 1%. Source: own calculations. 
In Table 6 we see that price elasticity for ethanol was quite similar 
to the one obtained for gasoline, showing that the products are perceived as 
substitutes (-0.57and -0.55). In both gasoline and ethanol estimations travel 
distance was associated with a positive effect on quantities. Since I do not 
information on commuters, it is inconclusive whether there is larger demand 
for retailers located outside of the city center, as it might indicate.  
 Table 6. Demand Estimation for Ethanol 
Specification 1 2 3 
Dependent: logarithm of ethanol quantity 
_cons 
-40.45567 -43.16309 -40.73871 
(13.92972) (17.50656) (13.93184) 
lprecovendagas 
0.6206255 1.105276 0.6165984 
(0.6998246) (0.8535769) (0.7000006) 
lprecovendaetanol 
-0.5546346 -1.022595 -0.5548431 
(0.6414875) (0.7785791) (0.6415611) 
lcars 
4.206299 4.40747 4.205395 
(1.129817) (1.419404) (1.129979) 
ltime      0.1383563 
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    (0.1556563) 
sigma_u 0.6769464 0.65156218 0.68346768 
sigma_e 0.41989428 0.45186623 0.42284094 
rho 0.72215537 0.67523815 0.72319519 
Standard errors in (). 1. Instruments: lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas; 2. 
lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas  ltanksg; 3. lpm_conc_1km  lprecocompragas  
ltanksg. Source: own calculations. 
Using the structural demand, calculated overcharges were of R$0.38 
cents for ethanol (16% over estimated prices), against the price reduction 
observed in the reduced form. This affects damages estimation and fines 
calibration, as I show in the next session.   
5. Evaluating Competition Policy: Fines x Estimated Damages 
In order to calculate estimated damages with the results from the 
reduced and structural approaches, I must consider the net cross effects of the 
coefficients of both gasoline and ethanol retailers’ price in which other. For 
instance, one Real increase in ethanol price was related to R$0.0937471 cents 
rise in the gasoline price. Considering the hypothesis that colluders dropped 
ethanol price by -0.0382886, keeping the same proportionality, it is equivalent 
to assume that the net gasoline price augmentation was of R$0.135. For 
ethanol, it was about R$0.02.  
Worth to say that price overcharges were in line with the observed 
in refereed literature, such as in Connor and Bolotova (2006). There are 
studies about overcharge proportion being related to oligopolistic 
environments and higher barriers to entry17. As fuel retail is neither one of 
them, lower cartel overcharge is expected. This finding also reflects colluder’s 
preoccupation in setting the “right” price for which retailer considering 
differences up to the third decimal level18.      
To calculate the damages, one must consider the total quantity sold 
by each firm at the period; however, this information is not available for all 
the firms in collusion, which might lead to underestimated effect. Considering 
that involved retailers were also price leaders, regulating prices setting in the 
                                                     
17 Bolotova et al (2008) have a nice overcharge/industry characteristic correlation 
analysis.  
18 In one of the dialogues between Djalma Guarda Junior and Djalma Guarda, 
both son and father, the first insists to correct that agreed ethanol price was 1.269, 
not 1.259, as the father believed.  
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city, I estimate damages considering total volume sold both in the gasoline 
and ethanol markets during the cartel period. Calculated damages considering 
reduced and structural estimations and its cross effects are reported in Table 
7. Results from the last form show a higher damage than the reduced form. 
Total amount of damages were not very high especially because of the low 
duration of the cartel (3 months). 
Table 7. Damages estimations (R$) 
 Reduced form Structural form Total quantities sold 
in the period 
Estimated Damages 
Gasoline 134,515.8 457,936 131,048.3 295,352.8 
Ethanol -10,644.23 117,001.2 -15,167.73 92,648.25 
Total 123, 871.57 574, 937.20 115, 880.57 388, 001.05 
Source: own calculations. 
The amount of Cade’s fine summed up R$10,964,962.2. This is 20 
times higher than the highest estimated damages. Optimal deterrence theory 
states claims that fines should be inversely proportional to the probability of 
being discovered in crime. If firms exclusively think about collusion as an 
economic decision to increase profits and refrain from ethical principles, the 
question to be answered is whether the gain from price fixing outweighs 
expected punishments.  Probability of detection is very difficult to assess, 
although some studies had tried that. The research of Allain et al (2013) 
reviews the main papers that tried to assess these probabilities, ranging from 
10% to 33%, consistent with the probability of detection for other crimes. 
Using this information to evaluate applied fines, I observe that Cade’s policy 
choice in the case seemed to be higher with the expected deterrence effect, 
considering damages, dawn raid costs and the probability of being caught. 
However, Cade’s policy reflected a deterrence effect of 5%, which may be 
considered a more realistic to the authority’s capacity of cartel detection, given 
the proportionality of the authority to the country dimensions.  
Table 8. Fines (Punishment) Considering the Probability of Detection 
Probability of being caught Penalty1 Penalty2 Penalty3 Penalty4 
0.05     2 477 431.40        11 498 744.00        2 317 611.40        7 760 021.00    
0.1     1 238 715.70          5 749 372.00        1 158 805.70        3 880 010.50    
0.15        825 810.47          3 832 914.67           772 537.13        2 586 673.67    
0.3        412 905.23          1 916 457.33           386 268.57        1 293 336.83    
Source: own calculations. 
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6. Final Considerations 
The necessity to evaluate public policies is an important issue to 
justify the amount of investment done in one matter. The analysis of cartel 
punishment effects is one way to verify how Competition Authorities are 
currently dealing with such crimes, considering that they are hard to detect 
and that investigations require financial and human resources expenses. The 
above analysis is a first insight to provide a view of how appropriate are the 
actual fine decisions done by the Brazilian Competition Authority.  
Under Brazil’s current competition law, cartel fines may vary from 
0.1 to 20 percent of the companies’ revenue from the year before the conduct 
began. The law also says fines should never be lower than the benefits 
companies received from the conduct — when it is possible to calculate such 
benefits. However, these calculations are not straightforward; so, more time 
should be given to the evaluation of past condemned cartels fines considering 
the estimated damages. So far, this is the second study on cartel damages done 
in Brazil. Considering that the first study did not point to any deterrence 
effects of the applied policy, the estimations presented above do show that 
applied fines ended up considering it. The results here obtained may also help 
the Authority in the dosimeter fines calculations, which may have to consider 
not only the gravity of the conduct, but the industry characteristics. Industries 
with lower participants may be object of higher fines than colluding firms in 
a more oligopolistic environment.  
In addition to competition policy debate, this paper also contributed 
to the fuel substitutability debate. Ethanol is perceived as a perfect substitute 
for gasoline. Subsidies for the promotion of this fuel as a more ecological 
friendly fuel might not achieve the wanted substitution effect if firms pricing 
strategy consider the ethanol equivalent fuel price in gasoline.    
Future work though must consider a different specification of the 
demand choices for retailers, especially considering that neighbor’s stores 
must have a greater impact on prices than distant ones. The demand 
characterization for both fuels (gasoline and ethanol) might allow a better 
assessment over the price cost margins through a structural simulation using 
the hypothesis that stations choices are differentiated goods. 
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